By Chandra Mohan
New Delhi (Syndicate Features): There was no official ‘celebration’-as opposed to the jingoistic celebrations by the Bharatiya Janata Party-on May 11 to mark the anniversaries of the Pokharan nuclear tests spread over two days in May 1998 (11th and 13th) and the previous one in May 1974 (18th). The country still seems unsure whether it was good for India to gatecrash into the exclusive nuclear club-and be treated there like an upstart. Opinion on the matter is clearly divided between two opposing views. There are those who want India to keep away from anything that has anything to do with ‘nuclear’-whether arms or energy. Others disagree and say that the country has buckled under international (read US) pressure in restricting its military nuclear programme.

A plethora of informed opinions has enlarged the debate by linking India’s nuclear policy with issues like India-US relations in the context of the civil nuclear deal with the US. India’s vote against Iran at an international forum has been cited as a signal of India’s surrendering its sovereignty to the US, further proved by the country’s deliberate slow march to a more potent military power.

The ambiguity in defining what a credible but minimum nuclear deterrent means has angered a lot of experts, particularly when they shift their gaze on China and ponder over the insidious nature of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. It will appear that these critics would want to see nothing less than a ‘parity’ between the nuclear arsenals of India and China. To the lesser informed that looks highly unlikely. Even if it is possible to achieve that goal, a question that needs to be answered honestly is does the country believe in a nuclear arms race? Equally relevant is the question whether India is in a position or capable of keeping up with the Chinese as they relentlessly stockpile and upgrade their entire military machine, including their nuclear arsenal? The Chinese ambition is not restricted to being the world’s top economy; it also wants to be the foremost military power in the world.

That will surely worry India, given the fact of 1962 Chinese aggression. In fact, China, as a great military power, worries all of South-east Asia; also Japan and South Korea. None of these countries is a nuclear power; nor do they have a programme to add nuclear teeth to their military. But despite their reservations about the Chinese intentions and occasional sharp differences over policy matters they have been developing close relations with China. It does appear that these countries are not thinking of military ‘parity’ with China despite their lurking fears about a future Chinese military adventure against them.

Perhaps some Indian experts will explain how is it that these countries believe that they can keep the deadly Chinese dragon away by developing bilateral trade and cultural ties with Beijing. Not for these countries the question of competing with China in military terms, much less begin a nuclear arms race with Beijing.  Now, this policy may or may not be suitable for India. And nobody can suggest that India shuts eyes to any Chinese threat. But Indians will feel better if experts tell them whether or not they can, like the nations of the South East and Far East Asia, survive-and thrive-under the shadow of the Chinese dragon. Merely raising a scare about India’s failure to match the Chinese military hardware, including its nuclear arsenal, does not help matters. It will also clear the minds of those who have been smarting under the impression that the Delhi’s aim it to become a great economic rather than a great military power.

The ‘bomb lobby’ in the country regrets that India missed the chance of detonating a nuclear device in the 1960s. By doing so India would have been a de jure nuclear power like the Big Five. Whether the country was really in a position to do so cannot be said for sure. But what is the basis of the assumption that the Big Five would have admitted India formally into their exclusive nuclear club? Except for the former USSR, the other four countries would have moved heaven and hell to keep India out.

After blasting the government for its cowardice in not being able to accelerate the country’s nuclear programme to match the Chinese, one expert who supports the Pokharan tests has said in his commentary that India was able to make rapid economic strides only because it was able to force its way into the nuclear club. That does not sound convincing. Most Indians, even if not as well informed as ‘experts’ are, would credit that success to the people’s entrepreneurial skills or opening up of the economy and globalisation. It is there for all to see that the Pokharan tests, if anything, slowed down the country’s progress because of sanctions that followed, particularly the transfer of dual-use technology.
The sanctions business becomes more incomprehensible when those who accuse the government of making tardy progress on the military (nuclear) front vehemently oppose the civilian nuclear deal with the US. One thing that has been clear is that India does want to see sanctions on nuclear trade with other countries lifted. The continuation of the sanctions is likely to shorten the life of some of the nuclear reactors and will, in turn, have an impact on the military programme too. Does the country’s nuclear programme benefit by rejecting a civilian nuclear deal with the US?

Doing nuclear business with the US is not acceptable to a section in the country for ‘ideological’ reasons. It is fine with them if India does the same business with countries of their choice, such as Russia. But that is not possible as long as sanctions remain in place. Many who oppose the deal with the US avoid answering this question, while focusing on perceived threats to the country’s ‘sovereignty’, particularly in pursuing an ‘independent’ foreign policy.

To illustrate their fear these people have been quoting ad nauseam the Indian vote against Iran at two meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency, allegedly under US pressure. Even if it is accepted that India had erred in taking that stand, the experts who condemned that move have now found that India has suddenly came out of the American clutches by being ‘defiant’ in playing host for a few hours to the fire-brand Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, during his recent visit to the region.

For the laymen it is hard to believe that a dialogue of less than an hour between the leaders of the two countries had revived the fortunes of the LNG deal signed with Iran five years ago (on which Iran has reneged) and the still uncertain Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline where both Iran and Pakistan expect India to be generous with funds while shutting eyes to the danger of sabotage of lines in hostile territories, not to mention the certainty of frequent Iranian and Pakistani demands for tariff and transportation hike.
  
If, as many critics have said, Iran was hurt by the Indian stand at the IAEA it would not have been the Iranian president coming to New Delhi but the Indian head of the government who should have been visiting Tehran—and not for a few hours---to bring the Indo-Iranian ties back on even keel. There are certainly many good reasons for Indo-Iranian ties to remain strong. But it sounds too simplistic when even some ‘experts’ broadcast the view that merely by hosting Ahmadinejad for a few hours New Delhi regained its ‘sovereignty’. (Syndicate Features)